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Abstract
This article considers the credit given to dishonest assistants and knowing recipients in claims for
disgorgement, with greater focus on dishonest assistance. Traditionally, equity has awarded a parsimonious
‘just allowance’ for work and skill. The language of  causation in Novoship (UK) Ltd v Mikhaylyuk
[2014] EWCA Civ 908 suggests a more generous restitutionary approach which is at odds with the
justification given: prophylaxis. This tension makes the law incoherent. Moreover, the bar to full
disgorgement has been set too high, such that the remedy is unavailable in practice. Therefore, even if  the
restitutionary approach is affirmed, it must be revised.
Keywords: disgorgement; equitable allowances; remoteness of  gain; dishonest assistance;
knowing receipt.
Disgorgement in equity has become more widely available. It is familiar as against afiduciary where the profits of  the defaulting fiduciary’s efforts are appropriated to the
principal, seen in cases such as Boardman v Phipps.1 In Novoship (UK) Ltd v Mikhaylyuk, the
Court of  Appeal held that disgorgement is available in principle against accessories
(meaning dishonest assistants and knowing recipients) to a breach of  fiduciary duty.2
Disgorgement is used equivalently to account of  profits in this article3 and is a gain-based
remedy that takes net profit.4 The remedy against accessories is personal, not proprietary,
but is not limited to the principal sum extracted, if  any. The judgment appears to support
a claim in principle for full account of  profits, not limited to smaller measures such as the
Wrotham Park ‘hypothetical bargain’.5
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1     [1967] 2 AC 46 (HL).
2     [2014] EWCA Civ 908, [2015] QB 499.
3     Peter Devonshire, Account of  Profits (Thomson Reuters 2013) para 2.2 also argues they are equivalent. See also
Paul Collins, ‘Liability for Profits in Breach of  Contract: Revisiting Attorney-General v Blake’ [2015] RLR 44, 47
in n 32. Cf  James Edelman, Gain-based Damages: Contract, Tort, Equity and Intellectual Property (Hart 2002) 72ff.
Edelman identifies a distinction where the account of  profits, unlike disgorgement, would include costs
avoided. English law is sceptical of  such a claim: A-G v Blake (Jonathan Cape Ltd Third Party) [2001] 1 AC 268
(HL) 286.
4     There are other gain-based measures: see James Edelman, ‘Restitutionary Damages and Disgorgement
Damages for Breach of  Contract’ [2000] 2 Restitution Law Review 129 for a taxonomy.
5     Wrotham Park Estate Co Ltd v Parkside Homes Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 798 (Ch).
In Novoship, the Court of  Appeal decided upon a primary test of  ‘effective causation’
to decide whether to disgorge an accessory’s gain or not; asking whether the gain would
have been made ‘but for’ the wrong was not appropriate. Gain ‘effectively caused’ by the
wrongdoing would be disgorged, otherwise it would be credited to the wrongdoer’s own
legitimate efforts. In addition, there is a discretion whether to disgorge or not and
disgorgement will not be ordered if  it would be disproportionate to do so.6 Causation is
the language of  restitution for wrongs;7 contrast this with the traditional language of
permitting a ‘just allowance’ in the breach of  fiduciary duty cases.8
Where there is disgorgement, a question always follows: is the wrongdoer permitted
to retain any of  the gain? And if  so, why and how is it measured? As Virgo points out,
such questions of  assessment have received insufficient attention in both cases and
commentary.9 Given the expansion of  the jurisdiction to disgorge, these questions are
especially due for fresh examination. Ultimately, it comes down to this: should we give
accessories a generous, or parsimonious, allowance? And, having made that choice, what
is the appropriate conceptual framework and language and, indeed, what, if  any, is the
difference between restitutionary and traditional equitable approaches? These are the
questions this article attempts to answer.
This article takes the position that there is a difference in balance between the two
approaches. Restitutionary approaches are often more generous, tending to allow profit-
sharing, where the traditional equitable approach is more parsimonious, tending to allow
only remuneration for work and skill expended. Moreover, two specific differences are
identified. Both were in point in Novoship.
The first is the treatment of  external or neutral events such as market movements.
The equitable approach would exclude them from an allowance where restitutionary
approaches may not. The second is that the court held that if  the principal forgoes an
opportunity and the dishonest assistant takes it, disgorgement of  the gain would be
disproportionate and thus disallowed. This is not the case for fiduciaries.
This leads to a problem. The justification for disgorgement given in the judgment was
the fiduciary one: the deterrence of  (or prophylaxis against) wrongdoing.10 This is
incongruous with the generosity of  the tests. The problem is a lack of  consistency and
this makes the law difficult to apply and endangers its coherent development. It is argued
that paying insufficient attention to the normative matters behind the tests adopted led to
this problem.
Moreover, even if  this generous approach is to be preferred, the tests adopted for
disgorgement need refinement. By construing ‘effective causation’ so narrowly, the Court
of  Appeal appears to have unwittingly limited disgorgement to the hypothetical bargain
measure, which arguably is not full-blown disgorgement at all.11
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6     Novoship (n 2) [119].
7     E.g. Graham Virgo, ‘Restitutionary Remedies for Wrongs: Causation and Remoteness’ in Charles E F Rickett
(ed), Justifying Private Law Remedies (Hart 2008); Peter Birks, An Introduction to the Law of  Restitution (Clarendon
1989) 351ff.
8     E.g. Lord Provost v Lord Advocate (1879) 4 App Cas 823 (HL Sc) 839. See generally J D Heydon, M J Leeming
and P G Turner, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity: Doctrines and Remedies (5th edn, LexisNexis Butterworths
2014) para 5–280.
9     Virgo (n 7) 301.
10   Novoship (n 2) [73]–[77], [110]; Fiona Trust & Holding Corporation v Privalov [2010] EWHC 3199 (Comm), (2011)
108 LSG 17 [66] both citing Consul Development Pty Ltd v DPC Estates Pty Ltd (1975) 132 CLR 373 (HCA) 397.
11   See e.g. Edelman (n 3) 2–3 and ch 3.
Although a less generous approach is advocated, it is these two problems with which
this article is primarily concerned. The level of  generosity of  allowances is a matter of
opinion and the courts may differ in their opinion. However, the coherence and limitation
points are matters of  logic and principle. One cannot be generous and parsimonious at the
same time.
This argument proceeds as follows. The justification for and the approaches for
defining allowances and the terminology and how it has been applied in practice are set
out. This enables a close analysis of  Novoship, which brings out the aforementioned points.
Finally, how the law could be refined is considered.
1 The facts of Novoship
In order to hang the discussion on some concrete facts – and because specific criticism
of  the case will be made – a brief  outline of  Novoship (UK) Ltd v Mikhaylyuk is necessary.
Novoship was a case of  dishonesty and corruption by one of  Novoship’s managers, one
Mikhaylyuk, who stood in a fiduciary position to them. There were two corrupt
transactions. The first concerned charters ostensibly between Novoship and Petroleos de
Venezuela SA, which were arranged by Mikhaylyuk (the PDVSA transaction). In reality,
one Ruperti was interposed between the two, overcharging PDVSA and paying bribes to
a company called Amon, which was controlled by one Nikitin. Participating was clearly a
breach of  fiduciary duty by Mikhaylyuk. Nikitin knew that Mikhaylyuk had required
bribes as the price of  chartering Novoship’s vessels. This made Nikitin a dishonest
assistant in respect of  this transaction.
The second concerned the ‘Henriot transaction’ from which the gain (some $109
million) was sought. At the same time, Mikhaylyuk was arranging charters to Nikitin’s
other company, Henriot Finance. Nikitin spent his own money in this venture and paid
as near to market rates for the head charters as mattered.12 However, this was still a
breach of  fiduciary duty on the part of  Mikhaylyuk because of  (at the very least) the
realistic possibility he was putting his own interests ahead of  Novoship’s. As for Nikitin,
he knew enough such that it was dishonest to enter into these charterparties, which made
him a dishonest assistant in respect of  this transaction too. Christopher Clarke J summed
it up by remarking that Mikhaylyuk ‘was continuing a relationship which was corrupt in
inception and had not been cleansed’.13
Nikitin’s profit was largely due to the extraordinary rise in the market between the
conclusions of  the head charters and the sub-charters he entered into. What was sought
was therefore the profit of  the accessory, not that of  the principal under some form of
joint and several liability. Nikitin did not pay or receive bribes in respect of  the Henriot
transaction.14 However, there was a clear causal link to his wrongdoing – without the
dishonest assistance in the PDVSA transaction, Nikitin could not have made the profit
because he would not have been able to secure the head charters.15 This is referred to as
the ‘collateral advantage’ Nikitin obtained.
The independent enterprise Nikitin ran, that of  sub-chartering Novoship’s vessels,
was entirely legitimate, save that it was made possible by the corrupt relationship.
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12   Novoship (n 2) [65].
13   Novoship (UK) Ltd v Mikhaylyuk [2012] EWHC 3586 (Comm) [509].
14   Novoship (n 2) [8].
15   Ibid [9].
Novoship had wished to charter the vessels at the then market rates in order to lay off
the risk of  market fluctuations.16 This was important to the Court of  Appeal’s reasoning.
Nikitin escaped liability for two reasons. First, because the profit was caused, according
to the Court of  Appeal, ‘effectively’ by the shipping market’s rise rather than the
wrongdoing (Nikitin had been a skilful businessman and had judged the market well);17
and second, there was a discretion to refuse disgorgement and it would be exercised
because it would have been disproportionate to disgorge given Novoship’s desire to lay
off  the risk,18 or, in other words, because Novoship had actively declined the opportunity.
2 Justifying disgorgement
2.a FIDUCIARIES
First consider why disgorgement is justified. This article accepts the conventional
justifications for the disgorgement remedy against fiduciaries: prophylaxis and
deterrence.19 If  there is a requirement to deter in all circumstances, there must be a
remedy that does not depend on there being actual losses. Otherwise there would be no
remedy if  it is not possible to rescind a transaction (and have restitution of  benefits) since
there are no punitive damages in English equity. The familiar propositions as to the
fiduciary rules follow. It does not matter that the principal suffered no loss:20 ‘[B]etter the
principal receive a windfall than that the fiduciary retain the profit.’21 Equity will not allow
a fiduciary to keep his or her wrongful gain pour encourager les autres.22
There are also principled accounts that justify disgorgement against fiduciaries for
other reasons. For instance, Lionel Smith argues that a fiduciary is subject to a primary
obligation to render any profit made in the relevant circumstances immediately to her
principal and it is this that explains the rule that no loss is necessary. That primary
obligation springs from the acquisition of  part of  the principal’s autonomy when the
fiduciary acquires legal powers to act on her behalf.23 Because this includes profit from
activities that go against the principal’s interest, often variants of  the somewhat fictitious
‘good man theory’ are pressed into service. This holds that equity treats the wrongdoer as
if he was acting on behalf  of  his principal all along.24
2.b ACCESSORIES
One principled justification for the disgorgement of  accessories can be dismissed shortly.
Lionel Smith’s autonomy argument requires a pre-existing fiduciary relationship, but
accessories are not fiduciaries.25 Since that relationship is absent, one might fix dishonest
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16   Ibid [117].
17   Ibid [114].
18   Ibid [120].
19   E.g. Harris v Digital Pulse [2003] NSWCA 10, (2003) 197 ALR 626 [307]; Bank of  Ireland v Jaffery [2012] EWHC
1377 (Ch), [287], quoting John McGhee, Snell’s Equity (32nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2010) para 7–018.
20   Keech v Sandford (1726) Sel Cas Ch 61, 25 ER 223; Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1967] AC 134, [1942] 1 All ER
378 (HL); Boardman v Phipps (n 1).
21   Lord Peter Millett, ‘Bribes and Secret Commissions Again’ (2012) 71 Cambridge Law Journal 583, 600.
22   Murad v Al-Saraj [2005] EWCA Civ 959, [2005] WTLR 1573 [74]; Warman International Ltd v Dwyer (1995) 182
CLR 544 (HCA) 562.
23   Lionel Smith, ‘Fiduciary Relationships: Ensuring the Loyal Exercise of  Judgement on Behalf  of  Another’
(2014) 130 Law Quarterly Review 608.
24   Sir Peter Millett, ‘Bribes and Secret Commissions’ [1994] Restitution Law Review 7, 20; A-G for Hong Kong v
Reid [1994] AC 324 (PC).
25   Williams v Central Bank of  Nigeria [2014] UKSC 10, [2014] AC 1189.
assistants and knowing recipients with liability to disgorge through the principles of
conventional accessorial liability. This would, however, make the accessory’s liability
duplicative of  the fiduciary’s, i.e. the accessory would be liable for the fiduciary’s gain, not
his own.26 This proposition has been rejected in the case law. In Ultraframe (UK) Ltd v
Fielding, Lewison J was concerned that holding a dishonest assistant liable to disgorge
profits made by the trustee directing the breach was ‘begin[ing] to look like a punitive
measure’.27 The Court of  Appeal was also concerned that the remedy was not fashioned
as a form of  forfeiture in Novoship.28
Since the liability is for the accessory’s own profits, it can only be independent or
primary liability.29 Ridge, considering dishonest assistance, argues that disgorgement can
be justified as simply the appropriate remedy for a wrong.30 Disgorgement is appropriate
where the level of  the accessory’s culpability or closeness to the fiduciary warrants it. An
example Ridge gives is the active and deliberate encouragement of  the breach of  fiduciary
duty by the dishonest assistant.31 The justifications (or ‘pragmatic grounds’) Ridge gives
are: (i) an alternative claim in the event that the fiduciary is impecunious or has
absconded; and (ii) the deterrence of  third parties.32 The first is applicable only to claims
for compensation, so that leaves only the second for claims for disgorgement.
According to the Court of  Appeal in Novoship, the principle of  deterrence applies to
accessories as well as fiduciaries. The court endorsed dicta in Consul Development Pty Ltd v
DPC Estates Pty Ltd holding that:
If  the maintenance of  a very high standard of  conduct on the part of  fiduciaries
is the purpose of  the rule it would seem equally necessary to deter other persons
from knowingly assisting those in a fiduciary position to violate their duties.33
Although the court left open the choice between that and the other justification in Consul
Development, namely that it would be ‘inequitable’ to allow the accessory to retain the profit,
this is hardly a reasoned justification. Deterrence was the only substantive reason given.34
Consequently, the only basis to support disgorgement claims against accessories is
that of  deterrence. It follows that, if  fiduciary prophylactic principles are to be applied to
accessories, then the law should not take into account whether the principal suffered a
loss or whether the principal would gain a windfall. The culpability of  the accessories
should, however, matter.
It also follows that knowing recipients should perhaps be treated differently to
dishonest assistants. Knowing receipt may not warrant full disgorgement or disgorgement
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26   Steven B Elliott and Charles Mitchell, ‘Remedies for Dishonest Assistance’ (2004) 67 Modern Law Review 16,
17.
27   [2005] EWHC 1638 (Ch) [1597]–[1601], quoting Elliott and Mitchell (n 26) 41.
28   Novoship (n 2) [116] quoting Murad v Al-Saraj (n 22) [85]: ‘The kind of  account ordered in this case is an
account of  profits, that is a procedure to ensure the restitution of  profits which ought to have been made for
the beneficiary and not a procedure for the forfeiture of  profits to which the defaulting trustee was always
entitled for his own account.’
29   In this sense the term ‘accessory’ can be criticised as a misnomer: Sarah Worthington, ‘Exposing Third Party
Liability in Equity: Lessons from the Limitation Rules’ in Paul S Davies and James Penner (eds), Equity, Trusts
and Commerce (Hart 2017) (forthcoming) ‘Conclusion’, point 3. However, dishonest assistance and knowing
receipt liability is founded on an underlying breach of  trust or fiduciary duty, so these wrongdoers are
accessories to a primary wrong in that sense.
30   Pauline Ridge, ‘Justifying the Remedies for Dishonest Assistance’ (2008) 124 Law Quarterly Review 445, 446.
31   Ibid 455.
32   Ibid 446.
33   Novoship (n 2) [76] quoting Consul Development v DPC (n 10) 397.
34   In Fiona Trust (n 10) [66], Andrew Smith J did not choose one basis over the other either.
at all because there will always be a loss to sue for – the value of  the property received.
This is not necessarily the case for dishonest assistance.
3 Justifying allowances
3.a FIDUCIARIES
Once disgorgement is justified, the question is: how much? There is a countervailing
principle to disgorgement against fiduciaries: non-forfeiture. While disgorgement clearly
has a punitive element,35 it is not forfeiture sensu stricto. It is said that ‘equity never
forfeits’.36 In fiduciary cases, liability is limited either to the fiduciary’s actual net profits
(if  any),37 to what the principal ought to have received,38 or to actual losses.39 In Vyse v
Foster the Court of  Appeal said that ‘[t]his Court is not a Court of  penal jurisdiction’.40
While these two principles are clearly in tension, the one uncontroversial point is that
disgorgement is of  net profits. Legitimate expenditure is always deducted, hence the
phrase ‘account of  profits’. It is a short stretch to make an allowance for work and skill
expended by the wrongdoer, as this is little different to expenditure on a consultant to do
the same. It is where this principle is carried forward that the controversy builds. It is clear
that permitting the wrongdoer to share in the profits reduces the deterrent effect. And
this leads to the well-known dictum of  Lord Goff  insisting that:
[T]he exercise of  the jurisdiction [to award allowances must be] restricted to
those cases where it cannot have the effect of  encouraging trustees in any way to
put themselves in a position where their interests conflict with their duties as
trustees.41
Nonetheless, as Harding points out, Lord Goff  did not go so far as saying that allowances
were never justified. Therefore, even on his strict view, some level of  allowance is
appropriate,42 even if  it tends towards over-protection. Moreover, restricting allowances
too severely would amount to forfeiture. In the recent case of  Murad v Al-Saraj,43
Arden LJ quoted concerns from the old case of  Docker v Somes.44 A hypothetical example
was of  a pharmacist who bought drugs with £100 of  trust money and earned £1000
selling them to patients. Lord Brougham suggested these were cases primarily of  skilful
labour that would not be subject to disgorgement.45 ‘Full’ disgorgement absent an
allowance certainly appears to trespass into the realm of  forfeiture in such cases.
That is as far as it goes. There are statements to the effect that:
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35   Re Western of  Canada Oil, Lands and Works Co (No 1), Carling’s Case (1875) 1 Ch D 115 (CA), 123; David Stevens,
‘Restitution, Property and the Cause of  Action in Unjust Enrichment: Getting by with Fewer Things (Part 1)’
(1989) 39 University of  Toronto Law Journal 258, 279.
36   Gary Watt, ‘Property Rights and Wrongs: The Frontiers of  Forfeiture’ in Elizabeth Cooke (ed), Modern Studies
in Property Law Volume 1: Property 2000 (Hart 2001) 116. See also A-G v Alford (1854) 4 De GM & G 843, 853;
43 ER 737, 742; Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 669 (HL), 692.
37   Vyse v Foster (1872) LR 9 Ch App 309 (CA Ch), 333.
38   Ibid; A-G v Alford (1854) 4 De GM & G 843, 851; 43 ER 737, 741.
39   Brickenden v London Loan & Savings Co [1934] 3 DLR 465 (PC); Swindle v Harrison [1997] 4 All ER 705 (CA).
40   Vyse v Foster (n 37) 333.
41   Guinness plc v Saunders [1990] 2 AC 663 (HL) 701. This must apply to all types of  fiduciaries, not just trustees.
42   Matthew Harding, ‘Justifying Fiduciary Allowances’ in Andrew Robertson and Tang Hang Wu (eds), The Goals
of  Private Law (Hart 2009) 344.
43   Murad v Al-Saraj (n 22) [85].
44   (1834) 2 My & K 655, 39 ER 1095.
45   (1834) 2 My & K 655, 667; 39 ER 1095, 1099.
[Equitable] remedies will be fashioned according to the exigencies of  the
particular case so as to do what is ‘practically just’ as between the parties. The
fiduciary must not be ‘robbed’; nor must the beneficiary be unjustly enriched.46
However, the limit of  robbing the fiduciary appears to be set at the level of  what would
cause forfeiture. The dicta quoted above show that a windfall is not considered
unwarranted enrichment provided it is given in the name of  prophylaxis.47
3.b ACCESSORIES
Allowances for accessories – or indeed reasons for excusing the accessory from
disgorgement altogether – would therefore be justified for at least the same reasons as for
fiduciaries. The further reason is to reflect any lesser culpability on the part of  the
accessory. There are some justifications for treating accessories differently and they are
examined here.
The distance of  the accessory from the fiduciary relation was an important factor for
the Court of  Appeal in Novoship.48 It relied heavily on the Supreme Court case of  Williams
v Central Bank of  Nigeria where it was confirmed that accessories are not fiduciaries and the
rules are less strict: ‘No trust has been reposed in [the accessory].’49 A limitation period
is applied to accessories where one is not to a trustee, at least in respect to the stewardship
of  trust property.50
However, that is just one factor. The difference in limitation period is justified by the
fact that the trustee is entrusted with the long-term stewardship of  property. The trustee’s
involvement in the trust’s affairs is entirely to be expected and gives no grounds for
suspicion without more. The accessory is typically not involved so closely and for such a
long period of  time and, as such, there is no excuse for excessive delay on the part of  the
beneficiary in taking action.51 But what justifies a shorter limitation period does not
necessarily justify reduced liability in other areas.
Indeed, as the Court of  Appeal said in Novoship, there is an imperative to deter
fiduciary wrongdoing and its assistance, hence the accessory is also made liable.52 This
suggests that the underlying norms are the same or similar even if  the concrete rules have
to be made different to reflect the accessory’s different place in the scheme of  things. Old
dicta such as ‘clothing [the] stranger . . . with the fiduciary character, for the purposes of
making him accountable’53 can further be taken to reflect the courts’ attitude that the
norms are the same and the rules adopted must remain within the range of  possibilities
consistent with those underlying norms.54 If  one is to take Lord Goff ’s dictum concerning
deterring fiduciary breach55 seriously – or as seriously as is possible while still accepting
a need for allowances – these matters need to form part of  the discussion. They did not,
however, in Novoship.
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46   Maguire v Makaronis (1997) 188 CLR 449 (HCA), 496, quoted in Sinclair Investments (UK) Ltd v Versailles Trade
Finance Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 347, [2012] Ch 453 [47].
47   Section 2.a.
48   Novoship (n 2) [68]ff.
49   Williams v Central Bank of  Nigeria (n 25) [31].
50   Ibid.
51   Ibid [13].
52   Novoship (n 2) [76] quoting Consul Development v DPC (n 10) 397.
53   Docker v Somes (1834) 2 My & K 655, 665; 39 ER 1095, 1098.
54   A point also made by Virgo (n 7) 328ff.
55   See text to n 42 above.
4 Approaches to formulating liability and allowances
4.a NOMENCLATURE AND BALANCE
The issue is then how to express in concrete rules the principles governing allowances
and, indeed, whether there is liability – the two overlap, as will be seen when discussing
restitutionary measures. Accordingly, this section is concerned with the terminology used
and precisely what it means in order to address the questions of  basis of  disgorgement
and allowance. There are two broad choices as to the principles governing measure of
allowance, as Mason J states:
One approach, more favourable to the fiduciary, is that he should be held liable
to account [only] of  the particular benefits which flowed to him in breach of  his
duty. Another approach, less favourable to the fiduciary, is that he should be held
accountable for the entire business and its profits, due allowance being made for
the time, energy, skill, and financial contribution that he has expended or made.56
Theories of  restitution do not preclude the possibility of  adopting Mason J’s latter
approach. It is a crude caricature to say that restitutionary theories are an attempt to
homogenise the rules for vastly different causes of  action into a set of  fixed rules. Indeed,
Birks went so far as to argue that restitution for wrongs ought to be studied within the
law of  wrongs, not the law of  unjust enrichment.57 He identified three broad classes of
restitution for wrongs: (a) the deliberate exploitation of  wrongdoing; (b) anti-enrichment,
as opposed to anti-harm, wrongs; and (c) prophylaxis.58 While he did not consider
quantum and allowances in respect of  each class, his schema comfortably accommodates
the possibility of  different norms supporting disgorgement claims, putting fiduciary
actions in category (c) and leaving space for more generous allowances in other actions.
Furthermore, Virgo has argued that rules of  causation and remoteness will have to be
adapted with respect to ‘the different policies underpinning particular wrongs’.59
This leads to the names proposed for each approach identified by Mason J. Since the
prophylactic approach demands no profit is left with the wrongdoer, the first approach
can conveniently be called ‘non-prophylactic’ and the second ‘prophylactic’. Clearly, they
are ends of  a continuum and, in practice, giving an allowance may be a difficult and
uncertain exercise in finding the balance.
4.b EQUITABLE JUST ALLOWANCES
Conventionally, equity has adopted the latter approach. Fiduciary allowances are
discretionary60 and it is for the wrongdoer to establish that he should be granted an
allowance.61 Perhaps the most significant factor is the blameworthiness of  the
wrongdoer. In Boardman v Phipps the worst of  the fiduciary’s behaviour towards the trust
was perhaps insufficient disclosure and a liberal allowance was therefore permitted.62
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56   Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41 (HCA), 110.
57   Peter Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2005); Peter Birks, ‘Misnomer’ in
W R Cornish et al (eds), Restitution: Past, Present and Future: Essays in Honour of  Gareth Jones (Hart 1998).
58   Birks (n 7) 326–33.
59   Virgo (n 7) 303. Virgo did not tackle accessories to a breach of  fiduciary duty, most likely because that work
predates Novoship and the matter would then have seemed relatively unimportant.
60   Lord Provost v Lord Advocate (n 8) 839.
61   Warman v Dwyer (n 22) 561.
62   Boardman v Phipps (n 1).
Conversely, the defendant’s dishonesty was said to be a reason to deny him an allowance
in Murad v Al-Saraj.63
Even in the least culpable of  all breaches of  fiduciary duty – where the fiduciary has
actually made a profit for the trust that could not always have been made otherwise – a
profit share was not permitted: Boardman v Phipps.64 The texts list only O’Sullivan v
Management Agency and Music Ltd as an example where profit-sharing was permitted.65
There, the Court of  Appeal held that in exceptional circumstances there might be a small
profit element in the allowance given to the fiduciary.66 However, this was consistent with
a pre-breach agreement to share profits, which was knowingly agreed to by the claimant.
Moreover, the court expressly stated that the allowance had been reduced because of  the
wrongdoing.67
There are other factors,68 but these are the most significant. They lean heavily towards
keeping the allowance parsimonious, towards remuneration for skill rather than a share of
the profits. Certainly, in Warman International Ltd v Dwyer, it was noted that the fiduciary’s
unauthorised profit had been ‘carved out of  the business’ of  the principal and profit-
sharing was therefore inappropriate.69 In that case it was also said to be inappropriate to
allow profit-sharing if  the fiduciary had exposed the principal’s property to risk.70
4.c RESTITUTIONARY LANGUAGE: CAUSATION AND REMOTENESS
Fiduciary cases have eschewed the language of  causation and remoteness of  gain in
favour of  framing the issue as one of  granting an allowance. While the editors of  Meagher,
Gummow and Lehane’s Equity: Doctrines and Remedies dismiss recourse to these concepts as
having ‘no support in either the doctrines by or the practices of  the courts [and
dependent on] restitutionary theories of  an a priori kind’,71 the restitutionary theories are,
at the very least, a useful comparator. Moreover, that passage was apparently written
before the judgment in Novoship was handed down and certainly without reference to it.
Causation encompasses more than a simple connection to the wrongdoing. How
causation is drawn defines the kind of  link required. It may be thought that, at a
minimum, ‘but for’ causation is required: that the wrongdoer would not have made the
same profit in a way other than via breach of  duty. This is certainly what is apparently
required in theories of  restitution for wrongs derived from non-fiduciary cases.72 In the
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patent infringement case of  Celanese International Corporation v BP Chemicals Ltd, the award
was for the additional profits resulting from the infringement, rather than a complete
account because ‘[t]he question to be answered is “what profits were in fact made by the
defendant by the wrongful activity?”’.73 Implicit in this is that the defendant would have
been able to make and market the product in any event, and should be credited for those
hypothetical profits.
Celanese International also suggests that causation goes to quantum as well as liability. It
also suggests that, for this cause of  action, the measure of  disgorgement looks to the part
of  the gain caused by the wrongdoing and omits the part not so caused. Fiduciary cases
have rejected causation as a requirement. In Murad v Al-Saraj, the fiduciary breached his
fiduciary duty by failing to disclose that his contribution to a joint venture was by way of
set-off  rather than directly.74 Nonetheless, it was found that his co-venturers would have
continued in any event and would merely have demanded a greater share of  the profits.
The Court of  Appeal, by a majority, rejected the submission that the fiduciary should be
granted an allowance accordingly, meaning a ‘but for’ link to the profit was not required.75
Instead, as Harding points out, the causal enquiry in fiduciary cases has been to seek a
‘basic factual connection between . . . breach and . . . profit’.76
Nonetheless, fiduciary disgorgement cases have tended to insist on a degree of
sufficiency of  connection. This is captured in language such as ‘Did [the defendants] . . .
acquire[] these very profitable shares . . . in course of  their office of  directors?’77 But
most often it is proximity. This can be seen as a bar to cases where the wrongdoing was
of  minimal effect but not cases where the wrongdoing is one of  several causes of  the
profit. Moreover, there seems no reason why this kind of  apportionment ought not to
flow from both the ‘but for’ and sufficiency aspects of  causation.
Remoteness of  gain is also concerned with cutting off  recovery, but with reference to
different factors, often the time since the wrongdoing and where the profit arises from
different facts.78 If  I make an unlawful gain from my involvement in a car-maker and
invest that gain in another completely independent business making bicycles, there is an
argument that that second gain is due to my own efforts, even if  I did not have the money
otherwise (so the ‘but for’ causal link is made out). As Virgo points out, remoteness is
concerned to prevent the over-protection of  the principal.79
Although there is only limited support for them in the authorities,80 the tests
postulated for remoteness serve well to illustrate the point. Birks’ proposal was to limit
recoverable gains to the ‘first non-subtractive receipts’81 (or, as Virgo puts it, gains arising
‘directly from the commission of  [the] wrong’).82 The profits from subsequent
reinvestment of  the gains would not be subject to disgorgement. An alternative proposal
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is Edelman’s, which is that an innocent wrongdoer be stripped of  gains if  there was a
‘reasonable foreseeability of  that kind of  profit’.83 Deliberate or cynical wrongdoing
should not attract such a limit, in accordance with the law’s focus on culpability.
What these tests show is that, while there is a normative element in sufficiency of
causation, it becomes much more explicit in questions of  remoteness, as these tests show.
The profit from the bicycle business was still caused factually by the wrongdoing, even if
one considers the most effective cause to be my own efforts. If  I am excused from
disgorgement, it is for a normative reason such as preventing over-protection. Such
norms can form part of  either a causation test or a remoteness test, although they may
be better suited to one over the other.
4.d THE CONCEPTUAL VIEW: SIMILARITIES
Ultimately, reconciling the principles governing liability and allowances comes down to
the same fundamental issue: disgorging what is deemed to be due to the wrongdoing and
permitting the wrongdoer to keep what is deemed due to the wrongdoer’s own efforts.
The word ‘deemed’ disguises two factors. The first is the normative justification for what
is taken and what may be retained. The second is the set of  specific rules adopted to
determine the same.
In the context of  compensation for loss, the overlap between causation and
remoteness has long been acknowledged.84 Indeed, in recent times such doctrines
governing loss have been conceptualised as mere expressions of  the scope of  duty or
responsibility, most notably in the jurisprudence of  Lord Hoffmann concerning
causation, remoteness of  loss and the implication of  terms.85 Getzler highlights Lord
Hoffmann’s reflective point in South Australia Asset Management Corporation v York Montague
Ltd that causation ‘is deeply affected by the court’s normative judgment of  the purpose
and the context of  the duty whose breach is said to have caused the harm’.86 Similarly,
Stapleton notes that:
[T]he reasoning in these decisions is obscured because it is couched in such
causal formulations . . . The issue for the courts . . . is a normative one and as
such it is more conveniently posed in completely non-causal terms.87
Mitchell points out that the same applies ‘with equal force to claims for unauthorised
fiduciary gains’.88 It is a short reach to further generalise Stapleton’s proposition to orther
gains claims. The importance and centrality of  the normative foundation of  the matter
underpins Barker’s observations about why one must use caution in adopting the language
and principles from the doctrines limiting loss in tort and contract. He points out that the
foreseeability test for remoteness of  loss is justified by two reasons: (i) a moral objection
to making a defendant liable for all losses caused because of  the limits of  human
foresight; and (ii) the economic argument that the defendant is the cheapest loss-avoider
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and thus the claimant is incentivised to protect him or herself  from harms that might flow
from the loss. As he says, these matters are not relevant to gains claims.89 Consequently,
the rules are likely to be different and must be attuned to their (different) justifications.
The characterisation of  the enquiry as determining the scope of  the duty is too
nebulous to yield concrete rules of  law and the courts have drawn back from such
generalities in favour of  specific tests in recent leading cases concerning remoteness of
loss, construction and the implication of  terms in fact.90 Even so, the ‘scope of  duty’
analysis yields one vital point: the underlying principles governing liability and quantum
are normative in character.
The specific rules may well describe the precise responsibility of  the wrongdoer
accurately. They then give the law’s norms ‘concrete legal embodiment’.91 But those rules
do not always fully describe the operation of  the law. Sometimes one must rely on the
‘justificatory and explanatory’ function, as MacCormick puts it,92 of  the underlying norm
to inform the rule. So we have tests of  ‘effective causation’ and ‘proportionality’ but they
are only one part of  the picture. They can only be understood and interpreted properly
given the underlying norm. An underlying norm of  prophylaxis suggests a broad
construction of  what was effectively caused by the wrongdoing and that there is no need
for the principal to have suffered loss nor to have lost an opportunity. Conversely, an
underlying non-prophylactic norm suggests a narrower construction and that loss, or a
lost opportunity, is a requirement.
It therefore follows that both the particular formulations of  the rules and their
justifications must be carefully formulated in accordance with whatever standards the law
declares its desire to uphold. It further follows that there is a requirement of  coherence
– the rules and their justifications must be consistent in aim.93 If  they are not, the law will
become impossible to apply with any certainty or to understand or develop consistently.
4.e DIFFERENCES IN POINT
For many cases there will not be much of  a difference in outcome between approaches.
Both can accommodate remuneration and profit-sharing; indeed, neither appears
inherently limited to one or the other. We may quibble about the balance, but a significant
and apposite point of  departure is where one of  the concurrent causes of  the profit is
attributable neither to the wrongdoer, the wrongdoing, nor the party to whom the duty is
owed. Working through such circumstances demonstrates not only this, but also how the
construction of  ‘effective causation’ is determined by its underlying norms.
Such external causes may be due to a third party’s intervention. This will usually be an
intervention at the behest of  the primary wrongdoer, in which case the cause can be
attributed to the wrongdoer. Thus, the case of  a third party is unlikely to be difficult. In
practice another perennial problem is likely to yield a truly external cause: market
movements.
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This was an issue in Novoship. It was the extraordinary rise in the shipping market that
had generated the bulk of  Nikitin’s vast profit, at least numerically. The Court of  Appeal
was clear about what it considered the dominant cause of  the gain: ‘The real or effective
cause of  the profits was the unexpected change in the market.’94 The vivid colloquialism
‘real’ makes it clear that this was a normative judgment.
It is here where the distinction between the two approaches to allowances is at its
sharpest. The prophylactic approach, looking to the wrongdoer’s legitimate work and skill
put in, would not take market movements as part of  this and allow disgorgement
accordingly. It would disregard the fact that the claimant lost nothing or was uninterested
in the opportunity. In effect it says that this part of  the profit was not caused by the
wrongdoer because it was part of  the opportunity and, since the wrongdoer may only
retain the profits he caused, he cannot retain these profits.
The non-prophylactic approach would, however, do the opposite. It would look to
what was taken from the claimant – in this case nothing. Consequently, it would attribute
gains arising from the market movements to the wrongdoer’s legitimate work and skill. In
effect it says that this part of  the profit was caused by the wrongdoer and, since the
wrongdoer may retain the profits he caused, he may retain these.
If  the gains are extraordinary – as they were in Novoship – the difference in approaches
will be enormous. The underlying norms matter.
5 Analysis of Novoship
With all this in mind, it is possible to take a close look at Novoship v Mikhaylyuk and
particularly the meaning and ramifications of  the adoption of  the tests of  effective
causation and proportionality. The analysis is technical. However, it follows a relatively
simple path at a high level of  generality. Having established that:
1. the low-level rules adopted are an expression of  the norms and general
principles governing liability;
2. this particularly applies to causation and remoteness; and
3. accessories ought to be subject to disgorgement where appropriate;
The analysis continues:
4. the Court of  Appeal paid insufficient attention to those norms per se;
5. the court did not engage in sufficient consequential reasoning to identify the
difficulties the tests adopted would cause more generally; and
6. the court did not consider apportionment, with the result that:
7. the tests adopted were generous by any standards;
8. particularly, they take into account what the principal lost rather than
considering only what the wrongdoer gained;
9. this is in tension with the justification given – prophylaxis – which looks not
to what the principal lost but to what the wrongdoer gained; and
10. quantum appears limited to the Wrotham Park ‘hypothetical bargain’ measure,
something closer to compensation than disgorgement.
Finally, a solution to the problem of  dividing Nikitin’s gain, necessary if  one believes that
partial disgorgement was appropriate, is advanced.
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5.a REMOTENESS AND (EFFECTIVE) CAUSATION
‘Effective causation’ was not said to be a remoteness of  gain test in Novoship, but it has
some elements of  remoteness in it. Saying that the profits from the Henriot transaction
were effectively caused by other matters is in effect saying that they were too improximate
from the wrongdoing. The risks of  not adverting to the normative matters more explicit
in remoteness are noted by Mitchell, building on Stapleton. Framing the question in terms
of  remoteness ‘explicitly require[s] the court to assess whether or not imposing liability is
fair and in accordance with the principles underlying the rules that give the claimant his
cause of  action’.95 But:
In contrast, the causation question asks the court whether the facts of  a case
possess some apparently freestanding analytical characteristic – ‘Was the causal
chain broken by an intervening event?’ – a question which it is tempting for the
court to answer without explicitly discussing the reasons why the answer
matters.96
While the Court of  Appeal did engage with normative matters, it did so mostly while
applying the proportionality test. However, since both tests have to be met in order for
there to be disgorgement, the normative matters ought to have been part of  the
discussion of  what amounts to effective causation too. Yet the Court of  Appeal applied
the test as though it was a simple formula looking to the most effective cause.
5.b UNCERTAINTY AS TO THE REQUIREMENT FOR ‘BUT FOR’ CAUSATION
The test of  ‘effective causation’ was taken from Galoo Ltd v Bright Grahame Murray.97 It can
be traced back from that case to Monarch Steamship Co Ltd v Karlshamns Oljefabriker (A/B).98
These are common law contract cases. For an award of  compensation, the courts require
not just a ‘but for’ connection between breach of  contract and loss, but a degree of
sufficiency too, that the breach was an ‘effective cause’ of  the loss. In Monarch Steamship,
much was made of  the ‘dominant’ cause of  the delay in delivery being the vessel’s
unseaworthiness rather than ship’s requisition by the government for war purposes.
According to the Supreme Court in AIB Group (UK) plc v Mark Redler & Co Solicitors, there
is no objection to borrowing principles from the common law and applying them to
equitable actions, provided one is alive to the differences and is not blinded by the
similarities.99
Before considering the norms behind ‘effective causation’, consider the requirement
for ‘but for’ causation. While the Court of  Appeal acknowledged that the trial judge had
disavowed the need for a ‘but for’ link,100 it expressed disagreement with him at a rather
more general level, namely that ‘the same considerations that apply to a fiduciary [do not]
apply to a dishonest assistant who has no fiduciary duties’.101 But rather than expressly
admit or reject (i) a ‘but for’ test and (ii) a sufficiency test (‘effective causation’) distinctly,
the Court of  Appeal only went so far as to admit the latter and did not decide the
former.102 Saying ‘in our judgment the simple “but for” test is not the appropriate test’103
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does not distinguish between whether it is one of  a set of  two tests (it alone is not the
appropriate test), or it forms no part of  the set of  tests (it is inappropriate to consider it
at all). The court’s conclusion is equally unilluminating: the claim should be denied
because ‘there was an insufficient direct causal connection between entry into the Henriot
charters [or transaction] and the resulting profits’.104
It is submitted that ‘but for’ causation should not be required. Generally, prophylactic
remedies do not require this because deterrence demands a remedy for even a slight
connection to the wrong. Even in a loss claim, dishonest assistance requires only a very
weak causal connection, namely that some assistance was provided.105 ‘But for’ causation
is not required in fiduciary disgorgement claims. It should therefore not be required either
for non-fiduciary disgorgement claims where the justification is also prophylaxis.
5.c CONSTRUING ‘EFFECTIVE CAUSATION’
The next issue is how widely ‘effective causation’ should be construed. In the common
law compensation for breach of  contract case of  County Ltd v Girozentrale Securities, it was
decided that the offending act only needs to be ‘an’ effective cause.106 It was held that the
court is not required to choose the most effective cause and is not constrained to decide
there is liability only if  that was the defendant’s act or omission. Conversely, in Novoship
the effectiveness requirement was construed narrowly; the market movements were more
effective and that was the end of  it.
Owing to the factual peculiarities of  claims for disgorgement for dishonest assistance,
this issue will come up generally. To see this, consider how a dishonest assistant’s acts
would be evaluated by an effective causation test. If  a dishonest assistant receives a fee in
return for assisting a fiduciary in a breach of  fiduciary duty, it would be tolerably clear, on
any principle of  causation, that such ‘profit’ will have been caused by the dishonest
assistance. But many dishonest assistants – such as a bribe-giver who pays in order to
secure some advantage – will never make any profit unless he or she engages in an
enterprise separate from the primary wrongdoing.107 Such a dishonest assistant must,
however, receive some kind of  collateral advantage otherwise there would be no incentive
to act. This is illustrated by the facts of  Novoship. Without participating in Mikhaylyuk’s
dishonest scheme, Nikitin would not have been able to charter Novoship’s vessels in the
first place.
This issue was touched on in OJSC Oil Company Yugraneft v Abramovich, where it was
intimated that the proceeds of  the reinvestment of  an initial gain might be subject to
disgorgement from a dishonest assistant.108 That principle surely applies, mutatis mutandis,
to the exploitation of  a non-pecuniary gain. Abramovich was cited in Novoship, but not in
relation to this issue.109 Yet Abramovich suggests that the law must be tailored such that
some remoter gains are subject to disgorgement.
Indeed, given that the Court of  Appeal said the action was available in principle, there
must be some circumstances where it is in fact. It is unlikely that the court would have
declared this remedy available only to make it otiose. It must therefore be necessary to
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construe ‘effective causation’ widely in order for it to have any meaning at all in dishonest
assistance cases and, certainly, it should encompass gains caused by such collateral
advantages.
Yet the Court of  Appeal construed it very narrowly. Accordingly, it would have been
better if  the test had been called ‘dominant causation’.110 And in dishonest assistance
cases, where it is not necessary for the accessory to receive property, such profits will
inevitably be predominantly caused by the wrongdoer rather than the wrongdoing.
Therefore, as construed, ‘effective causation’ is very much a principle of  the non-
prophylactic approach, since it attributes such causes to the wrongdoer’s own efforts.
Conversely, if  ‘effective causation’ were backed by prophylactic norms, it would attribute
all but the ineffective causes to the wrongdoing.
5.d THE PROPORTIONALITY TEST AND LACK OF APPORTIONMENT
Consider now the proportionality test. It was introduced and applied under the broad
consideration that the court has a discretion over whether to award an account of  profits
or not in claims against accessories.111 The Court of  Appeal’s reasoning was limited to
noting that the remedy is discretionary in the non-fiduciary actions of  breach of
confidence112 and breach of  contract113 and approving the proposition in Fyffes Group Ltd
v Templeman that an account of  profits is not automatically awarded upon making out
liability against an accessory to a breach of  fiduciary duty.114
The judgment in Fyffes considered only breach of  confidence cases in respect of  this
point.115 Toulson J refused a full account of  profits because he had found that Fyffes
would have entered into the relevant agreement even if  the agent had not been
dishonest.116 It was not that full disgorgement was said to be disproportionate, but full
disgorgement was inappropriate because of  consent to the profit element demonstrated
by the antecedent profit-sharing arrangement. Hence, the reasoning takes in similar
factors to those falling under the proportionality test in Novoship. However, Toulson J
considered that they were relevant to quantum.
The possibility of  apportionment was noted above, when discussing Celanese
International.117 There are other cases too. In Seager v Copydex (No 2), only a ‘springboard’
or ‘headstart’ measure was awarded for the inadvertent use of  confidential information,
meaning a measure of  the advantage gained, namely a reduction in the development work
owing to the infringement.118 Conversely, a full account of  profits, due to intentional
appropriation, was awarded in Peter Pan Manufacturing Corporation v Corsets Silhouette Ltd.119
It is therefore surprising that in Novoship this was not raised in the judgment and the
proportionality principle was treated only as relevant to liability: ‘One ground on which
the court may withhold the remedy is that an account of  profits would be disproportionate
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in relation to the particular form and extent of  wrongdoing.’120 The consequence of  this
is so clear it needs no further argument: it is more likely to be disproportionate to
disgorge if  it is impossible to apportion.
This, it is submitted, is a significant cause of  the difficulties in Novoship. Thinking it
inappropriate or impossible to apportion the gain, the Court of  Appeal, having starting
out wanting at most a weaker prophylactic approach, decided that full disgorgement was
disproportionate. This was a reasonable conclusion given this (incorrect, it is submitted),
premise. But the result is that the tests were construed so generously that they have
steered the law far away from the justification the court posited, namely that liability exists
to deter breach of  fiduciary duty and its assistance.
5.e NOVOSHIP’S DISINTEREST IN THE OPPORTUNITY
That deals with the general aspect of  the proportionality test. That test, however, was also
given a specific aspect: it would be disproportionate to disgorge because the opportunity
was one Novoship had actively foregone. Since Novoship was content to lay off  the risk,
in effect it had disavowed any interest in any consequent profits, and hence the company
had lost nothing. Although Novoship would not have let vessels to Nikitin had the
company known of  the wrongdoing, it would certainly have let to someone else.121
This point was only explored by the Court of  Appeal summarily and, once again, a
closer look reveals factors that were overlooked. The court said that:
In our judgment [this gain] cannot be described as profits which ought to have
been made for the beneficiary, and therefore they fall outside the rationale for the
ordering of  an account.122
This is one rationale for disgorgement against fiduciaries, indeed, the one Lionel Smith
advances. That is fine as far as it goes. But that does not mean that it is the only rationale
for disgorgement, otherwise there could be no disgorgement in the intellectual property
and confidential information cases. Furthermore, a suitable rationale was given by the
Court of  Appeal in the instant case: the deterrence of  the assistance of  fiduciary infidelity.
This abrupt change in justification further suggests that the deterrence of  wrongdoing
was not a weighty factor in the tests adopted, despite what was said about it. What
appeared to matter instead is whether the principal lost an opportunity. This, again,
indicates a non-prophylactic approach – looking to the principal’s loss, where a
prophylactic approach would ignore this and instead look only to the wrongdoer’s gain.
Nonetheless, there simply must be something in the Court of  Appeal’s claim that the
purpose of  the jurisdiction is to deter fiduciary wrongdoing and also its assistance. If  so,
there may be a difference where the dishonest assistant procures, rather than merely
assists, the underlying breach of  fiduciary duty, as Ridge suggests.123 It might further be
thought that the dishonest assistant should be excused if  the fiduciary would have found
a way to execute his or her scheme without the need for this particular dishonest
assistant’s help. The overall justification is that disgorging from the mere assistant would
have no deterrent effect in these circumstances and the remedy is therefore not
warranted.
It therefore pays to look in more detail at what Nikitin did in the course of  the two
transactions and how they were linked. The trial judge was unable to determine the
Equitable allowances or restitutionary measures
120  Novoship (n 2) [119] (emphasis added).
121  Ibid [9], [117].
122  Ibid [117].
123  See text to n 31 above.
197
precise connection between the two transactions. Speaking from the vantage point of  the
PDVSA transaction, he was, however, ‘satisfied’ that it must have been one of  three
things and probably the first or the last of  them:
(i) Mr Nikitin provided or held out the prospect of  some other benefit to Mr
Mikhaylyuk; or
(ii) made, or constituted, some threat to him, or put him under some pressure,
which, in either case, resulted in Mr Mikhaylyuk getting Mr Ruperti to make
these payments; or whether, on the other hand
(iii)Mr Mikhaylyuk was seeking to benefit Mr Nikitin because of  some advantage
that he thought to gain thereby, either in the form of  a deal or otherwise.124
In all three eventualities, there is a degree of  active participation as opposed to merely
providing professional services for a fee. These eventualities also suggest that there is a
continuum of  participation and it is not simply a binary choice between procurement and
mere assistance. While not all of  them go so far as to say that Nikitin masterminded both
transactions, the culpability they disclose is far stronger than the familiar cases where
dishonest assistants have not been fully cognisant of  the underlying wrongdoing.125 What
is clear is that Nikitin was not merely assisting. Furthermore, even if  there was no
imperative to deter the particular fiduciary breach (and its assistance) in the Henriot
transaction directly – where Novoship was not interested in the opportunity – there was
an imperative to deter the other fiduciary breach. To do so, one must deter the Henriot
transaction because of  the link. One must ignore the objection that Nikitin did not
intercept a wanted opportunity.
While the Court of  Appeal reproduced the judge’s finding of  fact quoted above,126 it
went no further into the distinction between mere assistance and what is tantamount to
procurement, nor what would be necessary to amount to effective deterrence.127 Again,
this shows the Court of  Appeal’s approach was non-prophylactic.
5.f RESTRICTION TO THE HYPOTHETICAL BARGAIN MEASURE
One corollary of  all this was also unexplored in the judgment in Novoship. It has been
made so difficult – if  not impossible – on the ‘effective causation’ test to disgorge profits
arising from independent enterprises that the action is de facto limited to the Wrotham Park
hypothetical bargain measure. This is what was awarded in the only accessories case so far
that has come near to awarding something close to an account of  profits: Fyffes Group Ltd
v Templeman.128
In this case, one Templeman, an employee of  Fyffes and a fiduciary, was being bribed
by a client, Seatrade. Seatrade was therefore a dishonest assistant of  Templeman’s breach
of  fiduciary duty. However, it was found that Fyffes would have contracted with Seatrade
in any event – even if  the fiduciary had not been dishonest – albeit on better terms.
Toulson J therefore refused a full account of  profits, restricting the claimant to
compensation because ‘[i]nsofar as Seatrade made an “ordinary” profit element, it was not
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caused by the bribery of  Mr Templeman, but was profit for the provision of  services for
which there would have been a contract in any event’.129 The measure of  compensation
awarded was (as regards that particular head of  claim) on the hypothetical basis of  how
a prudent and honest negotiator, rather than Templeman, would have contracted.
Toulson J held that full account of  profits was available in principle, but not on these facts
(particularly owing to the existence of  a pre-existing profit-sharing agreement.)
What was awarded was in essence the Wrotham Park hypothetical bargain measure,
named after the case of  Wrotham Park Estate Co Ltd v Parkside Homes Ltd.130 It is a partial
account of  profits representing what would have been agreed. In that case, a property
developer had built more homes than it ought to in breach of  a restrictive covenant. The
beneficiary of  the covenant would not have entered into a bargain releasing the developer
from this restriction. Nonetheless, the beneficiary was given an award of  what that
bargain would have been had it been possible; a small percentage of  the anticipated
profits such a release would have yielded.131 The ‘gain’ disgorged was equivalent to the
loss caused by the breach, meaning the failure to honour a hypothetical contract of
release. Once it is accepted that one may look to such hypothetical circumstances, the
measure is less controversial – being for lost profits from that hypothetical contract,
which is a perfectly ordinary head of  claim in contract. So, the argument goes, the award
is not really account of  profits at all. It is just compensation.
Then, just as compensation is the usual measure for breach of  contract, it is the usual
measure for dishonest assistance. In Fyffes v Templeman the hypothetical bargain would have
been a variation improving the rate in Fyffes’ favour. The difference between the better
rate and the rate actually obtained was the same numerically as Seatrade’s additional profit
and thus was equal to the full disgorgement measure. On the facts, Fyffes’ loss was
Templeman’s gain.
Nonetheless, the two measures are conceptually distinct.132 Only the full
disgorgement measure gives access to profits such as those Nikitin made, because they do
not relate to the immediate wrongdoing but consequent activity, unlike in Fyffes or
Wrotham Park. That consequent activity is always predominantly caused by the wrongdoer
or at least attributable predominantly to external causes and not the wrongdoing. This will
be the case whether the opportunity was one the principal desired or not. It is therefore
always beyond the reach of  the test adopted, ‘effective causation’, as currently construed.
Consequently, on the current law, the measure for account of  profits for dishonest
assistance is limited to the hypothetical bargain measure in practice.
6 Solving the market movements problem
It is submitted that, given the foregoing, a true disgorgement remedy should have been
imposed, at least on the grounds that Nikitin had procured the scheme and perhaps on
the grounds that even the mere assistance of  a breach of  fiduciary duty should be
deterred by such a remedy. This is what the prophylactic approach requires. Any
proportionality requirement should extend to quantum for the reasons set out above. On
the strictest prophylactic approach, full disgorgement should have been imposed, but on
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a less strict prophylactic approach – perhaps justified by the distance of  the accessory
from the fiduciary relationship – apportionment may be appropriate.
This demands an answer to the question of  how the courts should apportion such
that disgorgement is not disproportionate or to take what was not effectively caused by
the wrongdoer. To recapitulate: the bulk of  Nikitin’s gain was, at least numerically, caused
by the rise in the market. If  disgorgement of  his profits is not to be disproportionate, a
way to split this cause in two must be found. The difficulty is, however, that there is no
obviously applicable principle upon which to apportion.
Birks’ and Virgo’s proposals for remoteness of  gains tests offer no assistance here.
Edelman’s proposal has more potential.133 However, even if  Nikitin was taken not to
have acted deliberately or cynically, the test would still not have apportioned his gain. The
difficulty is that market movements are eminently foreseeable – move, put bluntly, is what
markets do.134 Therefore a foreseeability of  kind rule would do nothing to divide the
market movements into recoverable and non-recoverable portions.
However, foreseeability of  kind is not the only foreseeability test. For contractual
remoteness of  loss, there is a superadded requirement that the kind of  loss be ‘not
unlikely’ to occur.135 This is a way of  raising the bar to recovery. This requirement is of
no assistance to the issue of  market movements because it is most likely that they will
occur.136 It does show, however, that the foreseeability test has been modified where
necessary, in this case to narrow it. There is no reason why the test could not be widened
in different circumstances.
While in remoteness of  loss cases there is no need for the extent of  the loss to be
foreseeable in England137 (in Australia there is authority suggesting the opposite),138
there is no reason why foreseeability of  extent ought not to be part of  the test for cut-
off  in gain cases. As Barker notes, the underlying justifications are different.139
Conversely, there are good reasons why it ought to be. If  there is to be an allowance on
the prophylactic approach – allowing a defendant like Nikitin to be rewarded only for his
efforts and not for gains not attributable to those efforts – it is logical to allow only the
value of  what could have been foreseen. The gains attributable to the extraordinary and
unforeseeable market movements would then have gone to the claimant. Nikitin’s
allowance would indeed have been in the lower reaches and consistent with the principle
of  prophylaxis.
There is some judicial support for this proposition. In the US case of  Primeau v
Granfield, Learned Hand J considered the matter of  account of  profits for the
misappropriation of  a claimant’s money into a mining venture.140 One concern was the
correct apportionment. The minerals could be traced into and were therefore clearly
subject to the claim. The difficulty was the value created by their discovery and how much
that was due to the defendant’s own efforts. Some was due to the investment and skill put
in to discover them. But clearly not all was – there was some value in the minerals’ very
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existence too, because such endeavours involve elements of  risk and chance. Learned
Hand J eschewed ‘such metaphysics to ascertain how much such expenses contributed to
the ore’.141 Other figures – the payments to obtain the lease, to open the mine, to work
it and, crucially, the royalties paid – amounted to a proxy for that impossible question.
Considering the deal that would have been made by reasonable parties would lead to the
answer.
Transferred to the facts of  Novoship, these principles from Primeau v Granfield can be
restated mutatis mutandis. Nikitin took a risk and was rewarded when it paid off. But some
of  that reward can be put down to his skill and effort and expected gain, and the rest
down to a windfall caused by the luck and chance element within ‘Nikitin’s accurate or
fortunate forecast’,142 to quote the trial judge, of  the unforeseeably large market
movements. On a practical basis this might be calculated with reference to long-term risk
forecasts and historic average profits. This would allow such defendants to keep the
average or expected gain while disgorging exceptional gains, yielding a parsimonious and
just allowance.
Such apportionment would not, as a matter of  definition, be disproportionate. Quite
the opposite: one would apply the proportionality requirement to quantification rather
than look at quantum and ask whether it was proportionate to disgorge the full amount.
Moreover, the disgorged gain would also not be effectively caused by the defendant’s own
efforts, whereas the retained gain would. The difference is that in this proposal ‘effective
causation’ is also construed as an apportioning principle rather than merely a test for
liability. Moreover, it is supported by norms directly linked to the underlying and
espoused policy of  the law, which makes it possible to apply accurately. Clearly, there is a
difficulty with precision – the outcome will be fairly uncertain – but the courts accept that
it is impossible to be perfectly precise in such cases and what is required is ‘not . . .
mathematical exactness but only a reasonable approximation’.143
Finally, it is important to emphasise that this proposal requires that the principal
actively foregoes the opportunity, as in Novoship. Had the dishonest assistant
misappropriated an opportunity the principal desired, the answer is simpler. Interception
should always justify a full account of  profits.
7 Conclusion
In the first case to consider at length full disgorgement against a dishonest assistant,
Novoship (UK) Ltd v Mikhaylyuk, the Court of  Appeal adopted a considerably more
generous approach than the traditional equitable one. Turning the equitable principle on
its head, it sought to leave the wrongdoer with what was not due to the wrongdoing rather
than to take all but that not due to the wrongdoing. It gave precedence to the fact that
the principal lost nothing. As for the former, the difference may appear slight, even
semantic, but it is not. The court considered that gains caused by neutral factors such as
market movements were not due to the wrongdoing and thus left them with the
wrongdoer. The deterrent effect is therefore much reduced and the approach cannot be
called prophylactic. As for the latter, this is also a non-prophylactic approach because
prophylactic remedies do not require loss to be suffered.
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While worryingly generous to those who assist breaches of  fiduciary duty, this would
at least be coherent when one considers that dishonest assistants and knowing recipients
are not fiduciaries and this may justify treating them more leniently. But it conflicts with
the court’s claim that the jurisdiction to disgorge exists to deter fiduciary wrongdoing and
its assistance. The generosity of  the allowance and the way the tests were construed are
not consistent with this justification. This inconsistency endangers the coherent
application and development of  the law. If  in precedents the decisions point one way but
the justifications another, it will be impossible to predict the outcomes of  claims where
the facts are novel. The courts should take one position or the other and stick to it. Either
the justification is not prophylaxis and deterrence and the outcome of  Novoship is right,
or the justification is prophylaxis and the outcome is wrong.
The root cause of  this, it is suggested, was a lack of  consideration of  the normative
underpinnings of  the terms ‘causation’ and ‘proportionality’. Treating them as formulae
to be applied in isolation from their underpinnings has led to this incoherence.
Accordingly, it is suggested that criticism of  the adoption of  the terms of  causation and
remoteness as alien to equity is beside the point. These terms do carry some helpful
directions as to what the courts are looking to – provided they are defined adequately and
not detached from their norms. Unfortunately, this was not the case in Novoship.
Perhaps most troubling of  all, the primary test adopted for disgorgement, ‘effective
causation’, has been construed so narrowly as to seemingly make it impossible to disgorge
anything beyond the Wrotham Park hypothetical bargain measure in all but the rarest of
cases, if  indeed at all. This cannot have been intended. It is therefore hoped that, in time,
the courts will revisit these issues and resolve them.
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